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We formulate a model of household behavior in which cooperation is costly and in which
these costs vary across households. Some households rationally decide to behave noncoop-
eratively, which in our context is an eﬃcient outcome. An intriguing feature of the model
is that, while the welfare of the spouses is continuous in the state variables, labor supply
decisions are not. Small changes in state variables may result in large changes in labor
supplies when the household switches its mode of behavior. We estimate the model using a
nationally representative sample of Italian households and ﬁnd that the costly cooperation
model signﬁﬁcantly outperforms a noncooperative model. This suggests the possibility of
attaining large gains in aggregate labor supply by adopting policies which promote cooper-
ative household behavior.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C79,D19,J22
Keywords: Household Time Allocation, Nash Bargaining, Nash Equilibrium; Maximum
Likelihood.1 Introduction
There is a long history of the theoretical and empirical investigation of married women’s
labor supply decisions. Perhaps the starting point for modern econometric analysis of this
question is Heckman (1974), in which a neoclassical model of wives’ labor supply was esti-
mated using disaggregated data. The starting point of his analysis, and most of those that
immediately followed, was the speciﬁcation of a household utility function which included
as arguments the leisure levels of wives and household consumption. With the addition of
a wage function, Heckman was able to consistently estimate household preference parame-
ters and the wage function in a manner that eliminated the types of endogenous sampling
problems known to create estimator bias when the participation decision is ignored.1
Many researchers have estimated household labor supply functions in the intervening
years using models based on household utility function speciﬁcations, though in many cases
the husband’s labor supply decision has been treated as predetermined or exogenous. Over
the last ﬁfteen years there has been a movement to view the family as a collection of
agents with their own preferences who are united through the sharing of public goods,
emotional ties, and production technologies. Household members are seen as behaving
strategically with respect to one another given their rather complicated and interconnected
resource constraints. Analysis of these situations has focused on describing and analyzing
cooperative equilibrium outcomes. Though models using the cooperative approach (e.g.,
Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), Chiappori (1988)) diﬀer in many
respects, they share the common characteristic of generating outcomes that are Pareto-
eﬃcient (the primary distinction between them being the method for selecting a point on
the Pareto frontier). The noncooperative approach, which uses Nash equilibrium as an
equilibrium concept (e.g. Leuthold (1968), Bourgignon (1984), Del Boca and Flinn (1995)),
leads to outcomes that are generally Pareto-dominated. The analytic attractiveness of
noncooperative equilibrium models lies in the fact that equilibria are often unique, an
especially distinct advantage when conducting empirical investigations.
A large number of empirical studies have tested whether observed household behavior is
more consistent with a single household utility function or with a model that posits strategic
interactions between household members. These studies have led to a decisive rejection of
the “unitary” model. Unfortunately, there have been few empirical studies to date that
have attempted to actually estimate a collective model of household labor supply (some
notable exceptions include Kapteyn and Kooreman (1992), Fortin and Lacroix (1997), and
Blundell et al. (2005)). Two of the more important reasons for the paucity of empirical
studies are the stringent data requirements for estimation of such a model and lack of
agreement regarding the “reﬁnement” to utilize when selecting a unique equilibrium when
a multiplicity exist (as is the case in virtually all cooperative models).
Some researchers have advocated using the hypothesis of Pareto eﬃciency in nonunitary
models as an identiﬁcation device (see, e.g., Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992) and Flinn
(2000)). Our view in this paper is slightly more eclectic. We view labor supply outcomes
as either being associated with a particular utility outcome on the Pareto frontier (the
one chosen under symmetric Nash bargaining) or to be associated with the noncooperative
1While Heckman’s model was based on an explicit model of utility maximization, it did assume that the
labor supply decision of the husband was predetermined.
1equilibrium point. In reality there are a continuum of points that dominate the noncoop-
erative equilibrium point and that do not lie on the Pareto frontier, however developing
a model that allows such outcomes to enter the choice set of the household seems beyond
our means.2 Our paper expands the equilibrium choice set to two focal points, but it still
represents a very restrictive view of the world.
Even under an assumption of eﬃciency there is wide latitude in modeling the mechanism
by which a speciﬁc eﬃcient outcome is implemented, as is evidenced by the lively debate
between advocates of the use of Nash bargaining or other axiomatic systems (e.g., McEl-
roy and Horney (1981,1990), McElroy (1990)) and those advocating a more data driven
approach (e.g., Chiappori (1988)). The use of an axiomatic system such as Nash bargain-
ing requires that one ﬁrst specify a “disagreement outcome” with respect to which each
party’s surplus can be explicitly deﬁned.3 It has long been appreciated that the bargaining
outcome can depend critically on the speciﬁcation of this threat point. Most often in the
household economics literature the threat point has been assumed to represent the value to
each agent of living independently from the other. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) provide an
illuminating discussion of the consequences of alternative speciﬁcations of the threat point
on the analysis of household decision-making. In particular, instead of assuming the value
of the divorce state as the disagreement point for each partner, they consider this point to
be given by the value of the marriage to each given some default mode of behavior, which
they call “separate spheres.” In this state, each party takes decisions and generally acts in
a manner in accordance with “customary” gender roles. Lundberg and Pollak state that
households will choose to behave in this customary way when the “transactions costs” they
face are too high.
In this paper we develop and estimate a model of household labor supply which allows
for both cooperative and noncooperative intrahousehold behavior.4 We endow husbands
and wives with individual utility functions deﬁned over consumption and leisure, and for
simplicity (and due to data limitations) we constrain utility interactions to be deﬁned solely
with respect to joint consumption of all market goods purchased by the household. We
assume that the utility functions of spouses are Cobb-Douglas and that the Cobb-Douglas
parameters are randomly distributed in the population according to a distribution function
G(α1,α 2), where αi is the preference parameter attached to (private) leisure by spouse i. We
adopt a neoclassical labor supply approach in that spouses are assumed to receive wage oﬀers
at the beginning of the period and are free to choose any level of labor supply in the feasible
set [0,T i], where Ti is the time endowment of spouse i. Wage oﬀers are drawn from the joint
2We should note that the cooperative equilibria in our model do in fact generally lie inside the Pareto
frontier, at least the Pareto frontier deﬁned in the costless implementation case. Given the cost of non-
compliance, characterized by ξ, our cooperative equilibria do belong to the Pareto frontier associated with
ξ.
3The sharing rule approach advocated by Chiappori and others avoids the requirement of explicitly
specifying a threat point by positing something of a reduced form approach to the selection of an outcome
on the Pareto frontier. Though estimation of the sharing rule does not require speciﬁcation of a disagrrement
outcome, it does require explicit assumptions regarding the arguments of the utility functions of the two
spouses.
4Lugo-Gil (2003) contains an analysis of a model based on a similar idea. In her case, spouses decide on
consumption allocations in a cooperative manner after the outside option is optimally chosen. All “intact”
households chose a threat point either of divorce or noncooperative behavior. The choice of threat point has
an impact on intrahousehold allocations.
2distribution F(w1,w 2); due to assortative mating, these wage draws may be correlated.5 We
begin by investigating the case in which spouses behave noncooperatively. We characterize
the equilibrium type, i.e., whether both spouses work, one works, or neither works, in terms
of critical wage values conditional on preference types and household nonlabor income.
Perhaps the most innovative feature of the analysis is that we allow for a mixture of
cooperative and noncooperative equilibrium outcomes in the model. Under the preference
structure we assume, we ﬁrst show that whenever the noncooperative equilibrium results in
at least one spouse supplying time to the labor market, there exists a cooperative equilibrium
which Pareto dominates it and in which both spouses supply more time to the market than
in the noncooperative equilibrium. Since virtually all households in our sample of young
and middle-aged households have at least one person in the market, all would seem ‘eligible’
to improve the payoﬀ of both spouses by moving to a cooperative equilibrium, yet they do
not. To rationalize this outcome within our modeling framework, there must exist some
cost, in some form, to implementing a cooperative equilibrium. We provide a discussion of
the form such costs or constraints could take, before settling on one. We will assume the
presence of a tax, 1−ξ, on the consumption gains from cooperative behavior, a tax which is
household speciﬁc and that follows a distribution Q(ξ) in the population of households. We
show that given household preference and choice set characteristics, there exists a unique
value ξ∗ such that all households with a value ξ<ξ ∗ behave in noncooperative manner
while those with ξ ≥ ξ∗ behave cooperatively. Since cooperative behavior is costly, it is
not always ineﬃcient to behave noncooperatively. In our model of “costly cooperation,” all
outcomes are eﬃcient, including those which result in only one spouse working.
In our model, each household has a positive probability of being cooperative. The prob-
ability that a household is cooperative is an increasing function of the gains from coopera-
tion, which is measured here as the product of the surpluses attained by the spouses under
symmetric Nash bargaining. We assume that each household member faces a randomly-
determined cost of cooperation θ which has a population distribution function given by
M(θ;ζ). The parameter characterizing the distribution may be a function of household
members’ characteristics as well as environmental variables. The cooperation cost reduces
the surplus each individual gets from cooperation and. when θ is large enough, can make
noncooperation a preferable mode of behavior.
The empirical analysis is conducted using a relatively rich cross-sectional data set from
the Bank of Italy for the year 1998. In the future, we plan to use our modeling framework
to perform comparative analyses involving the Italian and U.S. labor markets. We view our
set up as being a general one in which household behavior can be compared across labor
market and cultural environments. In particular, we able to account for diﬀerences in intra-
household labor supply responses in terms of diﬀerences in (1) joint wage oﬀer distributions,
(2) intrahousehold preference distributions, and (3) costs of cooperative behavior. Taken
together, all three sources of household diﬀerences are capable of generating very diﬀerent
patterns of cooperative behavior across labor markets, which is the main innovation in our
modeling framework.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy discuss some aspects of
the Italian labor market and family structure. Section 3 contains a development of the
5For the moment we do not allow for “assortative mating” in terms of the preference parameter distri-
butions, i.e., we assume that the preference draws for a husband and wife are independent..
3theoretical framework employed, including a discussion of noncooperative equilibrium, the
cooperative equilibrium, and the cooperative equilibrium with coordination costs. In Section
4 we provide details of the maximum likelihood estimator employed to estimate the wage
distribution, preference distribution, and distribution of coordination costs - which are the
primitives of the model. In Section 5 we present the data and our (preliminary) empirical
results. Section 6 presents some illustrative simulation results, and conclusions are oﬀered
in Section 7.
2 Some Features of the Italian Labor Market
The Italian labor market is considered to be one of the most highly regulated among West-
ern European countries. Strict rules apply regarding the hiring and ﬁring of workers and
permissible types of employment arrangements. The hiring system and the high entry wage
as well as very strict ﬁring rules severely restrict employment opportunities for labor market
entrants. These labor market regulations are considered to be largely responsible for the
high unemployment rates of women and youth.
A particularly important aspect of the rigidity of the labor market especially as regards
married women is the limited menu of available employment arrangements. Progression to-
wards a more ﬂexible working hours system has begun later in Italy than in other countries
and has been much slower. This is partially due to the institutional constraints imposed
upon employers; for example, under current regulations social contributions paid by em-
ployers are strictly proportional to the number of employees, not their hours worked, which
makes the employment of two part-time workers more costly than one full-time employee.
Moreover, the service sector, where part-time work is traditionally more widespread, has
not developed as quickly in Italy as in other countries (Colombino and Del Boca (1990)).
Some have argued that the strong inﬂuence of unions, largely representing the interests of a
male membership, has skewed the labor market in the direction of oﬀering mainly full-time
jobs meant to be held for the majority of one’s adult life.
Another factor discouraging the participation of mothers is the structure of the Italian
child care sector. Public child care services are typically inexpensive relative to private
sector alternatives, though their capacity in terms of number of children and hours per
child is extremely limited, particularly for children under the age of four. While the public
system is highly subsidized and provides a quality of service that is comparable with pri-
vate alternatives, the hours in which it is available (assuming that a mother can ﬁnd a slot)
are incompatible with full-time work. Since part-time work options are limited, the com-
bination of these factors make it quite diﬃcult for mothers to ﬁnd proﬁtable employment
opportunities (Del Boca (2003)).
Given these rigidities, the neoclassical model estimated below in which wages are treated
as parametric and hours choices are “unconstrained” would appear to be a poor approx-
imation to the actual situation on the ground. As is true even in the U.S., there is an
extreme degree of clustering of hours outcomes around 40 hours per week (particularly for
husbands), with the female hours distribution clustered around 40, 30, and 0 hours. Be-
ginning from a smooth set of utility functions for spouses and a reasonably disperse joint
wage oﬀer distribution, it is diﬃcult to produce this kind of clustering without resorting
to institutional constraints, which are diﬃcult to quantify and introduce into a modeling
4framework, or an equilibrium analysis that speciﬁcally models the decisions of ﬁrms regard-
ing the types of wage-hours bundles to optimally oﬀer.6 Both these routes oﬀer their own
challenges and have their own drawbacks.
The model developed here has some hope of producing the types of observed clustering
of hours outcomes we observe in practice, at least within households in which both spouses
work. The reason is that switches in behavioral mode within the household are associated
with discontinuous hours “jumps” for both spouses. These types of discontinuities can
possibly better ﬁt the hours distributions we observe in practice. In the empirical work
conducted below we hope to get some idea of the model’s ability to generate reasonable
approximations to observed hours distributions.
3 Models of Household Labor Supply Decisions
Throughout the paper we assume that individuals have Cobb-Douglas preferences over
their own leisure and the consumption of a market good. Because we don’t have access
to consumption information, we will assume that all consumption within the household is
public. While this assumption is less than ideal, there are few attractive alternatives to it
because of the limitations of our data (it also considerably simpliﬁes the analysis, it must
be said). Let spouse i have a utility function given by
ui(li,c)=αi ln(li)+( 1− αi)ln(c),i=1 ,2,
where αi is the preference parameter of spouse i, li is their leisure consumption, and c is the
household consumption of a market good. The total amount of time available to spouse i is
denoted Ti, and the wage rate of individual i is given by wi. Total household consumption
is then
c = Y + w1(T1 − l1)+w2(T2 − l2),
where Y = y1 +y2, with yi denoting the nonlabor income of individual i. We have assumed
that the price of c is equal to 1 without loss of generality.
3.1 The Noncooperative Equilibrium
The noncooperative equilibrium solution is determined as follows. The objective functions
of the household members are characterized by the preference parameter draws (α1 α2).
Household nonlabor income Y is predetermined. Given preferences and Y, we describe
the noncooperative equilibrium as a function of the wage draws (w1 w2). For any set of
preferences and Y, the equilibrium solution may result in both spouses working, neither
working, or one of the two working. We characterize the conditions on the wage draws that
result in each type of equilibrium outcome, and then given the type, we present the actual
labor supply choices made by any spouse who is working.
The reaction functions of the spouses are used to determine all noncooperative outcomes.
Deﬁne the reaction function of spouse i given the labor supply choice of spouse i  as
ˆ hi(hi ) = argmax
hi
αi ln(Ti − hi)+( 1− αi)ln(Y + wihi + wi hi ),
6For an example of an analysis along these lines, see Aaberge, Colombino, and Strom (1998)
5which yields
ˆ hi(hi )=( 1− αi)Ti −
αi
wi
[Y + wi hi ],i=1 ,2; i   = i.
We begin by characterizing the critical wage values (w∗∗
1 ,w∗∗
2 ) that have the property
w1 <w ∗∗
1 and w2 <w ∗∗
2 ⇔ hN
1 =0a n dhN
2 =0 ,
where hN
i is the noncooperative equilibrium leisure choice of spouse i. These critical values
are determined as follows. If spouse 2 chooses not to supply time to the market then h2 =0 .
In this case, the reaction function of agent 1 yields a labor supply choice of




In this case individual 1 will choose to supply no time to the market whenever











We can perform the same analysis for individual 2 conditional on a leisure demand of
individual 1 equal to T1. This case is completely symmetric, and we ﬁnd the individual 2








From this result we know that if w1 >w ∗∗
1 or w2 >w ∗∗
2 then at least one of the two
spouses will work. To determine the conditions under which spouse 1 only, spouse 2 only,
or both spouses work, we return to the reaction functions of the two agents. Say that only
agent 1 is working at the wage w1. Then we know that the labor supply of spouse 1 is given
by [1], and we deﬁne the critical value w∗
2(w1) as that value of the wage oﬀer to individual
2 at which they would just be willing to supply time to the market. This critical value is
deﬁned as










Then we have agent 1 works and agent 2 does not if and only if w1 >w ∗∗
1 and w2 ≤ w∗
2(w1).
If the wage oﬀers satisfy these conditions, then the labor supply of spouse 1 is given by
ˆ h1(0).
The situation is symmetric with respect to the case of spouse 1 not working while spouse






6and in equilibrium spouse 2 will supply time to the market and spouse 1 will not if and
only if w1 ≤ w∗
1(w2)a n dw2 >w ∗∗
2 .
If both spouses work, the unique noncooperative equilibrium (hN
1 ,h N
2 )i sg i v e nb y
hN
1 = ˆ h1(hN
2 )
hN
2 = ˆ h2(hN
1 ),
which under our functional form assumptions implies
hN












where FI = Y + w1T1 + w2T2 denotes full (household) income. For the equilibrium to be
of this type, it must be the case that w1 >w ∗
1(w2)a n dw2 >w ∗
2(w1).
Table 1
Characterization of the Noncooperative Equilibrium
Equilibrium Hours Choices
Equilibrium Type w1 w2 hN
1 hN
2
I w1 ≤ w∗∗
1 w2 ≤ w∗∗
2 00
II w1 >w ∗∗
1 w2 ≤ w∗
2(w1) T1 − α1
w1[Y + w1T1]0
III w1 ≤ w∗
1(w2) w2 >w ∗∗
2 0 T2 − α2
w2[Y + w2T2]
IV w1 >w ∗










The noncooperative equilibrium in terms of market hours choices is summarized in
Table 1. For econometric purposes the fact that there is a unique equilibrium for every
possible value of Γ is an extremely useful property. We forego any detailed discussion of
the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium since all are standard.
3.2 Costless Cooperative Equilibria
It is clear that the equilibrium described in the previous section is ineﬃcient due to the fact
that neither spouse considers the welfare of the other when making their own labor supply
decisions. In this section we consider the characteristics of cooperative equilibria given the
environment we have described.
Prior to confronting the vexing issue of selecting from the set of cooperative equilibria,
we ﬁrst describe the set of such equilibria. Let the noncooperative labor supply equilibrium
of household with characteristics Γ = (y1 y2 w1 w2 α1 α2 T1 T2)b eg i v e nb y( hN
1 hN
2 )(Γ),
and deﬁne the noncooperative utility values of the two spouses by V N
i = αi ln(Ti−hN
i (Γ))+
7(1 − αi)ln(Y + w1hN
1 (Γ) + w2hN
2 (Γ)),i=1 ,2. In considering the cooperative problem, we
will make extensive use of the Nash product,
S(h1,h 2;δ)=[ α1 ln(T1 − h1)+( 1− α1)ln(Y + w1h1 + w2h2) − V N
1 ]δ (2)
×[α2 ln(T2 − h2)+( 1− α2)ln(Y + w1h1 + w2h2) − V N
2 ]1−δ.
Now given that a cooperative solution exists, if we simply impose the eﬃciency criterion
(i.e., that the equilibrium utility yields for the spouses lie on the Pareto frontier) it is well
known that the solution can be characterized as follows. Let (hC
1 (δ),h C
2 (δ)) denote the
arguments that maximize [2] for a given bargaining power parameter δ ∈ [0,1]. Then an
eﬃcient equilibrium labor supply choice is an element of the set (hC
1 (δ),h C
2 (δ)),δ∈ [0,1].
There is considerable debate as to the manner in which a particular outcome from this set
is selected, both in theory and practice. We will see that in this particular model, there
are situations in which the choice among cooperative equilibria is not an issue, since there
exists only one.
Before proceeding to some formal results on this question, some intuition may be helpful.
Given our speciﬁcation of the utility functions of the spouses, it is clear that there exists a
potential for substantial gains in the utility levels of each through cooperation. This is due
to the fact that in making noncooperative decisions the impact of one spouse’s labor supply
choice on the welfare of the other spouse (through the publicly consumed good c) is ignored.
For the case in which the noncooperative equilibrium has both spouses participating in the
market, a continuum of cooperative equilibria will always exist in which each supplies more
time to the market, where each equilibrium in the set corresponds to a unique solution value
to [2] associated with a distinct value of δ ∈ [0,1].
When one or both spouses do not supply time to the market in the noncooperative
equilibrium, a cooperative solution may not result in either spending more time in the
market. When this is the case, we will say that the cooperative equilibrium is not Pareto-
improving and is, in fact, identical to the noncooperative equilibrium. This occurs when
one, or both spouses, even after taking into account the impact of their labor supply decision
on the welfare of the other, would choose not to supply time to the market. As an extreme
example, consider the case in which spouse 1 has a wage oﬀer of 0. There will be a well-
deﬁned noncooperative equilibrium in this case in which h1 =0 , but there will be no
possibility of a cooperative solution existing since the impact of 1’s supplying time to the
market on agent 2’s welfare is nil. Below we derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions on
the set Γ for a cooperative solution to exist.
We now turn to the formalization of some of these results. We begin by stating and prov-
ing a result that will also be important when we consider the econometric implementation
of the cooperative model.
Proposition 1 In any Pareto-improving cooperative equilibrium the labor supplies of both
spouses are strictly positive.
Proof. Assume that in the noncooperative equilibrium hN
1 > 0a n dhN
2 =0 . Assume
that hC
2 =0 . In this case, for agent 2 to receive at least as high a level of utility under
cooperation it must be the case that hC
1 ≥ hN
1 . If hC
1 = hN
1 then the cooperative equilibrium
is identical to the noncooperative equilibrium and there is no welfare improvement for
8either spouse. If hC
1 >h N
1 then agent 1 has lower welfare under cooperation than under
noncooperation. The symmetric argument applies for the case of hN
1 =0a n dhN
2 > 0.
When hN
1 =0a n dhN
2 =0 , a cooperative equilibrium must have both spouses working by
a similar argument. If neither works under the cooperative equilibrium, their is no welfare
gain for either spouse since the cooperative and noncooperative equilibria are identical. If
only one works, for them to experience a welfare gain implies the other must experience a
welfare loss. Then both must work in any Pareto-improving cooperative equilibrium.
When both spouses work in the noncooperative equilibrium, there exists a set of eﬃ-
cient equilibria in which they both sell more time to the market than they would under
noncooperation. In the situation where at least one doesn’t work, the above proposition
implies that the cooperative equilibrium is unique and is identical to the noncooperative
equilibrium.
In characterizing the conditions for a cooperative equilibrium to dominate the nonco-
operative one, conditions are once again imposed upon the state space Γ. The critical wage
values that describe the subset of Γ associated with cooperation (which corresponds to both
spouses working) will be less than those derived above which characterized the simultaneous
participation decision in the noncooperative case.
When we allow for the possibility of cooperative behavior we immediately run into
several disturbing empirical implications. We begin by establishing a useful characterization
result.
Proposition 2 Let the noncooperative leisure choice of agent i be denoted lN
i . Then a
cooperative equilibrium exists if and only if
α1w2(T2 − hN
2 )+α2w1(T1 − hN
1 ) − α1α2(Y + w1T1 + w2T2) > 0.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that agent 1 is free to choose the hours h1 and
h2 subject only to the condition that agent 2 be made no worse oﬀ than she would be
in the noncooperative equilibrium. Deﬁne the choice of hours as the deviation from the
noncooperative level, or hi = hN
i + εi, with εi ≥ 0,i=1 ,2. Then the constraint on the
choice of hours facing agent 1 is given by
α2 ln(T2 − hN
2 − ε2)+( 1− α2)ln(Y + w1(hN
1 + ε1)+w2(hN
2 + ε2)) − V N
2 =0 .




(1 − α2)w1(T2 − h2 − ε2)
α2(Y + w1(hN
1 + ε1)+w2(hN
2 + ε2)) − (1 − α2)w2(T2 − hN
2 − ε2)
.








2 ) − 1
,
where cN = Y + w1hN
1 + w2hN
2 .
After substituting the constraint into the (pseudo) problem faced by 1, we have
max
ε1
α1 ln(T1 − hN
1 − ε1)+( 1− α1)ln(Y + w1(hN
1 + ε1)+w2(hN
2 + ε2(ε1))). (3)
9For an interior solution to exist, i.e., for ε∗
1 > 0, it must be the case that the derivative of



















⇒ α1w2(T2 − hN
2 )+α2w1(T1 − hN
1 ) − α1α2(Y + w1T1 + w2T2) > 0.

This result is very useful in characterizing the space of cooperative solutions. For exam-
ple, consider the situation in which both individuals work in the noncooperative equilibrium.
Unsurprisingly, there will always exist a cooperative equilibrium in this case, and as we have
seen, in the cooperative equilibrium both will supply more time to the market.
Corollary 3 When hN
1 > 0 and hN
2 > 0 a cooperative equilibrium exists.
Proof: Deﬁne the set of wages that produce a noncooperative equilibrium in which both
spouses work given their preference types α1 and α2 and nonlabor income Y by ΩB(α1,α 2,Y) ⊂
{w1 >w ∗∗
1 ,w 2 >w ∗∗
2 }. Then for any (w1,w 2) ∈ ΩB(α1,α 2,Y), we substitute the interior
solutions for hN
1 and hN
2 into CF to get








α1α2(Y + w1T1 + w2T2)
(1 − α1α2)
(1 − α1)(1 − α2)
> 0, ∀(α1,α 2) ∈ (0,1)2.

Perhaps the next result is slightly more surprising.
Corollary 4 When hN
i > 0 and hN
i  =0 ,i = i , a cooperative equilibrium exists.
Proof: Without loss of generality, say that hN
1 > 0a n dhN
2 =0 , and deﬁne the set of
wages that result in this outcome by Ω1(α1,α 2,Y). Then for any (w1,w 2) ∈ Ω1(α1,α 2,Y),





(Y + w1T1)] − α1α2(Y + w1T1 + w2T2)
= α1(1 − α2)w2T2
> 0, ∀(α1,α 2) ∈ (0,1)2.

Finally, we consider the case in which neither spouse works in the noncooperative equi-
librium. In such a situation, a cooperative equilibrium may or may not exist. The relevant
condition is easily derived.
10Corollary 5 When hN
1 =0and hN
2 =0 , a cooperative equilibrium exists iﬀ
α1(1 − α2)w1T1 + α2(1 − α1)w2T2 − α1α2Y> 0. (4)
Proof: Let the set of wages that result in neither spouse working be deﬁned by Ω0(α1,α 2,Y).
Then for any (w1,w 2) ∈ Ω0(α1,α 2,Y),C Fis given by
α1w2T2 + α2w1T1 − α1α2(Y + w1T1 + w2T2)
= α1(1 − α2)w1T1 + α2(1 − α1)w2T2 − α1α2Y.

This series of corollaries leads us to the main result of this section.
Proposition 6 In the cooperative equilibrium the labor supply choices (hC
1 ,h C
2 ) are either
(0,0) or (hC
1 > 0,h C
2 > 0).
Proof: We have shown that all noncooperative equilibria in which at least one spouse works
are dominated by a cooperative equilibrium in which both supply time to the market, and
in which both work at more than the noncooperative level. A subset of noncooperative
equilibria in which neither spouse works are dominated by cooperative equilibria in which
both do. In the complement of this set in Ω0(α1,α 2,Y) are all those wage pairs in which
no cooperative equilibrium dominates the noncooperative one, and in this set of wage oﬀers
the equilibrium is the noncooperative one of (0,0).
This last result indicates why our model as it currently stands cannot be used to ﬁt
the patterns of household labor supply observed in a country like Italy. The majority of
households in our sample have only one member supplyingtime to the market, almost always
the husband. This pattern cannot be reproduced by our model, but once we consider the
fact that the act of cooperation may only be possible if additional requirements are satisﬁed
our model has the possibility of ﬁtting the observed data more adequately.
3.3 Costly Cooperative Equilibria
What can account for the failure to cooperate as we have deﬁned it? There are a number
of possible reasons why households may fail to cooperate - as we have deﬁned the term in
our application. One natural way to account for “imperfect” cooperation is to posit the
existence of ﬁxed costs (see, e.g., Cogan (1981)). When applied to the household setting,
it may be reasonable to assume that (quasi-) ﬁxed costs are absorbed when both spouses
supply time to the market. The reason for such a supposition is that when at least one
spouse stays at home most mundane tasks associated with household maintenance can be
performed by him or her. When both are in the market place the household must purchase
at least some of these services in the market. If the quantity of these contracted services
is more or less independent of the hours choices of the spouses, they can be considered
quasi-ﬁxed costs.
Another natural and realistic way to generate the types of choices observed in the data
is to assume that in accepting employment individuals agree to work a minimum number
of hours per week at their job. While the propositions above suggest that positive hours
11will always be chosen to ensure cooperation, for many values of the state variables Γ these
choices can involve the supply of a small number of hours by one or both of the spouses.
A constraint that all employed individuals must work at least h hours will force those who
would choose some 0 <h<hso as to cooperate to select either 0 hours, and to resort
to the noncooperative equilibrium, or to choose an h at least equal to h so as to ensure
cooperation.
In either of the above two cases for certain values of the state variables it will sometimes
be too costly for the household to choose the “constrained” cooperative solution. Both of
these two scenarios seems plausible to us, though from a modeling perspective both share
the same diﬃcult problem of nonuniqueness. In both cases it is easy to show that for certain
values of Γ there can be two noncooperative equilibria and within the model there exists no
nonarbitrary way to choose between them. That there exist multiple eﬃcient equilibria is
well-appreciated - in our case we have utilized a Nash bargaining framework to arbitrarily
select one of the continuum of possible outcomes. The fact that there are multiple nonco-
operative equilibria complicates the problem further, since in that case the disagreement
outcomes used to deﬁne the “unique” Nash bargaining outcomes assume multiple values.
Our solution to this conundrum is to follow the lead of Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and
to allow for the existence of what they term“transactions costs” associated with cooperative
behavior. Their claim is that cooperative solutions are costly in terms of communication,
implementation, and monitoring. When such costs are “netted out” of the total surplus
from cooperation for each spouse the value of the cooperative state may be less than the
noncooperative “default” mode of behavior. While Lundberg and Pollak only posit the ex-
istence of such a cost in the development of a Nash bargaining model with a noncooperative
equilibrium as a threat point (instead of the more common usage of the value of the divorce
state as the threat point), in our case we will want to allow households to actually choose
this behavioral mode.
How to include such a cost is admittedly problematic. For simplicity we will assume
that the cost of cooperation is reﬂected in an decreased “enjoyment” of consumption. The
interpretation may be that the time involved in coordination decreases the amount of time
spent actively enjoying public consumption activities and thus operates eﬀectively as a
tax on consumption. Let 1 minus the “tax” rate be given by ξ, so that in a cooperative
equilibrium the value of labor supplies h1 and h2 to agent i is given by
αi ln(Ti − hi)+( 1− αi)ln(ξ[Y + w1h1 + w2h2])
= αi ln(Ti − hi)+( 1− αi)ln(Y + w1h1 + w2h2)+( 1− αi)lnξ
= Ui(h1,h 2)+( 1− αi)lnξ,
where Ui(h1,h 2) is the “normal,” or untaxed, utility individual i would receive from the
hours choices of h1 and h2, while the term (1 − αi)lnξ, w h i c hi sl e s st h a no re q u a lt o0
since ξ ∈ [0,1], measures the cost of cooperation to individual i. We treat the tax rate as a
random variable in the population of married households, with the size of ξ reﬂecting the
degree of trust, openness, etc. exhibited in the marriage. We denote the distribution of ξ
by Q(ξ;ζ), with ζ a ﬁnite-dimensional parameter vector, and assume it possesses a density
q everywhere on [0,1]. In the empirical analysis conducted below we assume that Q is a
12power function distribution, with
Q(ξ;ζ)=ξζ,ξ∈ [0,1],ζ >0.
Given a draw from Q and the preference parameters α1 and α2, we determine whether
a cooperative equilibrium exists as follows. We can deﬁne a “modiﬁed” Nash bargaining
objective function by
˜ S(h1,h 2;ξ,δ)=˜ S1(h1,h 2,ξ)δ ˜ S2(h1,h 2,ξ)1−δ
where
˜ Si(h1,h 2,ξ)=αi ln(Ti−hi)+(1−αi)ln(Y +w1h1+w2h2)−V N
i +χ[hi  = hN
i ](1−αi)lnξ, i =1 ,2.
The presence of the terms χ[hi  = hN
i ](1 − αi)lnξ indicates that the cooperation costs are
only born by agent i if his or her hours are not set at the noncooperative hours levels.7
Using the functions ˜ Si,i=1 ,2, we can now redeﬁne the household’s cooperative choice
problem as




˜ S(h1,h 2;ξ,δ)( 5 )
s.t. ˜ Si(h1,h 2,ξ) ≥ 0,i=1 ,2.
We use the expression “cooperative choice” problem advisedly, since one outcome is in
fact to choose the noncooperative solution. The crucial point is that all pairs (˜ h1,˜ h2)a r e
eﬃcient, even those corresponding to the noncooperative equilibrium, when we allow for
“costly” cooperation.
Our ﬁrst task is to characterize the decision to behave noncooperatively. Think of the
modiﬁed Nash bargaining problem as one of dividing the surplus between the agents using
the modiﬁed “threat points” of V N
i −(1−αi)lnξ for i =1 ,2. We wish to determine whether
there exists a nonnegative surplus for each spouse, and hence for the pair since the Nash
objective function is the product of a positive transformation of these surpluses, using these
modiﬁed disagreement outcomes.
Proposition 7 There exists a unique ξ∗(Γ) ∈ (0,1), independent of δ, such that the spouses
cooperate if and only if ξ>ξ ∗(Γ).
Proof. For any Γ we know that the cooperative Nash equilibrium dominates the non-
cooperative equilibrium when ξ =1f o ra n yδ. Similarly, we know that the noncooperative
equilibrium dominates the cooperative one for ξ =0f o ra n yδ.
Let the maximized value of the function ˜ S(h1,h 2;ξ,δ)b eg i v e nb y





7We know that in any cooperative equilibrium both agents will have to supply more time to the market
than under noncoooperation without costs of cooperation, and this is reinforced when cooperation costs
are positive. Thus if a cooperative equilibrium is chosen both agents will choose hours greater than the
noncooperative level and each will pay the cost (1 − αi)lnξ>0. Thus the index functions do not have to
explicitly include the condition that both spouses’ labor supply choices not be equal to their noncooperative
choices.
13Then the minimum value of ˆ S(ξ;δ) is equal to 0 when the noncooperative solution is chosen
and is otherwise greater than 0. When ˆ S(ξ;δ) = 0 this is true for all values of δ since ˆ S(ξ;δ)=
0 implies the noncooperative solution, which is independent of δ.When the function ˆ S(ξ;δ) >
0, then it is greater than 0 for all values of δ ∈ (0,1) since each spouse must receive a positive
surplus under the Nash bargaining solution. Starting from the value ξ =1 , which elicits
a cooperation choice for all values of δ ∈ (0,1) and which produces the maximum value of
ˆ S(·;δ) for any ﬁxed value of δ, ˆ S(ξ;δ) is strictly decreasing as we decrease ξ for all δ as long
as ˆ S(ξ;δ) > 0. Then there exists a connected set, (ξ∗,1], where ξ ∈ (ξ∗,1) ⇔ ˆ S(ξ;·) > 0.
Let us note a few features of the “costly” cooperative solution. As mentioned above,
all choices are eﬃcient, even when the noncooperative solution is implemented. Thus the
equilibrium outcome is consistent with Chiappori’s claim that only eﬃcient outcomes should
be considered as candidates for household equilibria.
In the empirical implementation of any cooperative equilibrium, costly or not, we will
face the problem of multiplicity. The tact we take is to use a Nash bargaining solution
with a prespeciﬁed value of the bargaining power parameter δ. This contrasts with the
“sharing rule” selection mechanism favored by Chiappori and his coauthors, though each
are in the end somewhat ad hoc procedures. When there is no cost to implementing a
cooperative solution, the usual case in the literature, then the actual solution will depend
on the bargaining power parameter δ.8 In the costly cooperation case, matters are somewhat
worse in that the solution will depend both on the bargaining power parameter and the level
of the cooperation cost, ξ.
As demonstrated in the above proposition, the probability of cooperation does not de-




where ˜ Q denotes the survivor function of ξ. Thus the cooperation decision is robust with
respect to δ.
F i n a l l y ,w ep o i n tt ot h er o l eo fξ in the determination of household labor supply. In
models designed to investigate the formation and dissolutions of households (recent exam-
ples of which include Brien et al (2006) and Brown and Flinn (2005)), it is standard to
include a common random variable in current period utility function of both spouses that
describes the marriage match value at that point in time. Variations in match quality over
time, in conjunction with changes in marriage speciﬁc capital values and/or the information
sets of the spouses, result in changes in marital status and/or changes in the investment
levels in marriage speciﬁc capital (as in Brown and Flinn (2005)). In our static model,
we abstract from issues regarding divorce and the general tenability of the marriage. Our
marriage speciﬁc random variable ξ does not directly contribute to the utility level of each
individual, but does so in a more indirect way through the selection of behavioral mode and
the payoﬀ in the cooperative equilibrium (when ξ>ξ ∗(Γ)). Just as the value of marriage
8In the sharing rule formulation instead, the equilibrium selected will depend on the econometric speci-
ﬁcation of the sharing rule and properties of the data. Since the econometric speciﬁcation of the rule is not
deduced from the primitives of the model, a degree of arbitrariness is always present.
14to each spouse is monotonically increasing in a model in which the match quality vari-
able enters linearly in the utility function, in this model as well the spouse-speciﬁc values
of marriage are nondecreasing in ξ. Thus are random variable ξ shares much in common
with less-subtle models of decision-making within marriage, though the interpretation of
the random variable and its eﬀect on behavior are quite diﬀerent.
3.4 An Extended Example
To illustrate the main features of the model we present some graphical representations of
how it works within the context of a particular example. We assume that the preference
parameters of the spouses are α1 = .3a n dα2 = .4. The time endowment of each spouse
is normalized to unity (i.e., T1 = T2 =1 ) . The weekly level of nonlabor income of the
household is Y =2 . We begin by illustrating how the set of “eﬃcient” solutions changes
with increases in the cost of cooperation. We will then look at the characteristics of the set
of wage oﬀers that lead to costly cooperative behavior. Finally, we look at the be looking at
the labor supply behavior of the household as a function of the wage oﬀer pair (w1,w 2),as
well as the distribution of welfare within the household.
In Figure 1 we plot the “costly” Pareto frontiers for our model given a value of w1 =4
and w2 = 3 at four values of the tax rate. When there is no tax, so that ξ =1 , then
we know that there exists a Pareto eﬃcient solution that dominates the noncooperative
equilibrium payoﬀs for the spouses. The Pareto frontier for this case is the curve furthest
from the noncooperative payoﬀ point. When we increase the tax rate to 0.02, the Pareto
frontier shifts inward but still lies substantially above the noncooperative payoﬀ point. We
see that even at a tax rate of 6 percent, the noncooperative solution is dominated by the
costly cooperative one, though the “size” of the Pareto frontier is relatively small. As the
tax rate increases, or as ξ decreases, the size of the Pareto frontier shrinks until it consists
of a single point. The tax rate at which the Pareto frontier is a single point is given by ξ∗.
For all values of ξ ≤ ξ∗, the “eﬃcient” outcome is the noncooperative equilibrium. Since the
noncooperative equilibrium is unique, this poses no problem for implementation. However,
when ξ>ξ ∗, we face the issue of choosing a point to call “the” equilibrium. As is relatively
standard, we use Nash bargaining with the modiﬁed outside options, those that include
(1 − αi)lnξ, to determine labor supplies in this case.
Figure 2 contains a plot of the cooperation set of wage pairs, after we added ξ =0 .92
to the other ﬁxed parameter values. The wage rates we consider are elements of the set
[2,8]2, and a value of ‘1’ on the z axis indicates that the wage pair produces a cooperative
outcome. As a rule, cooperation occurs when wages are less disperse (if the preference
weights were equal, i.e., α1 = α2, the set would be symmetric around the 45 degree line.
This suggests that positive assortative mating on both preferences and market productivity
characteristics may be more likely to lead to cooperative outcomes.9
We have plotted the equilibrium labor supply functions and payoﬀ functions for the two
spouses as a function of the wage pairs in Figure 3. The top two ﬁgures exhibit the labor
supply surfaces for the two spouses, while the ﬁgures underneath them map the spouse-
9Our highly stylized model has made no provison for household production and the gains to specialization
that such a generalization typically implies. Thus it is not too surprising that positive assortative mating
would be beneﬁcial in the framework considered here.
15speciﬁc payoﬀs. The most important point to note is that the labor supply functions are
discontinuous at points where the household shifts from one behavioral mode to another,
while the payoﬀ functions are everywhere continuous. Note that the payoﬀ functions are
monotone in the wage pairs, as we expect to be true under either the noncooperative or
costly cooperative equilibrium. We do see “creases” in the surfaces, and these occur at wage
pairs where the couple is switching between behavioral modes. At these points, the payoﬀ
functions are continuous, yet not diﬀerentiable in either w1 or w2.
The labor supply surfaces present a more interesting story. Shifts between behavioral
modes produce not only noncontinuous labor supply functions, but nonmonotonic ones,
even under our Cobb-Douglas assumptions. Consider Figure 3.b, which plots the labor
supply surface for spouse 2 as a function of the wage pairs. First, consider the labor supply
response of spouse 2, in equilibrium, as her wage increases given the wage of her husband. If
her husband has a high wage, say w1 =7 , then we see that at w2 = 2 she does not work and
the equilibrium is noncooperative. As her wage oﬀer increases to around 2.25, she enters
the market and “jumps” to a labor supply level of about 0.4. With further increases in her
wage oﬀer, up to w2 =8 , her labor supply smoothly increases while the labor supply of her
husband decreases. Thus given that her husband’s wage is 7, her labor supply is increasing,
but not continuously so, in her own wage.
The situation is diﬀerent when we ﬁx w1 =3 , for example. In this case, when her wage is
2, the pair cooperate. As her wage increases from 2, the couple initially engage in cooperative
behavior. Up until her wage reaches around 4, her labor supply is smoothly increasing
(and his smoothly decreasing). Past a critical wage rate, however, the wage disparities
are too great to maintain the costly cooperative equilibrium, and the couple switches to
the noncooperative equilibrium. At this point, the labor supply of both dramatically falls.
Increases in her wage rate, keeping the husband’s ﬁxed at 3, result in smooth increases
in her equilibrium labor supply up to the maximum wage we consider. Thus within any
regime, cooperative or noncooperative, her labor supply is smoothly increasing in her own
wage. However, when switching from the cooperative to noncooperative equilibrium, there
is a precipitous drop in the labor supply of both. In this case, her labor supply function is
not only discontinuous, it is also nonmonotonic in w2.
4 Econometric Speciﬁcation
Whether estimating a noncooperative or (costly) cooperative version of the equilibrium
household labor supply model, the underlying parameterization of the household’s problem
is invariant. We let household preferences be determined by a draw from a joint distribution
over α, the c.d.f. of which we denote by G(·;ν), where ν is a ﬁnite dimensional parameter
vector. Since α are parameters of Cobb-Douglas utility functions, we restrict the support
of G to be [0,1]2. For simplicity, in estimating the model we have assumed that preference
draws are independent for husbands and wives, and that the distribution of utility for each
spouse is a power distribution with
Gi(α)=G(α;νi)
= ανi,α∈ [0,1],ν i > 0.
















In the actual estimation, we allow for individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity in the parameters
µi. In particular, we assume that µi = βiXi, where Xi is a K × 1 vector of observable
characteristics of spouse i and βi is a conformable parameter vector. We allow σ12  =0 ,
which means that lnw oﬀers are not independently distributed (and of course, neither are
the w =e x p ( l n ( w)). In this way we allow for the possibility of assortative mating, although
in an admittedly crude manner.
The model is very parsimoniously speciﬁed, with the joint distribution of wages and labor
supplies determined by the parameters Ω = {ν1,ν2,β1,β2,Σ} in the case of noncooperation
and Ω  = {Ω,ζ) in the costly cooperation case.11 We ﬁrst consider the estimation of these
parameters under the assumption that the household equilibrium is noncooperative.
4.1 Estimation of the Noncooperative Model
We form maximum likelihood estimators for Ω. The likelihood function consists of four
components, one for each “type” of equilibrium represented in Table 1. We proceed through
them sequentially.
The likelihood of neither spouse working (Type I) is computed as follows. Conditional on
the preference parameter vector α, the probability that neither works is the joint probability
that the wage oﬀer to spouse 1 is less than w∗∗
1 (α1,T 1,Y) and the wage oﬀer to spouse 2 is
less than w∗∗




The marginal probability of this event, which is its likelihood, is obtained by multiplying









The second and third types of equilibrium in which only one spouse works are symmetric,
so we will only discuss the case in which spouse 1 works and spouse 2 does not (Type II).
In this case the wage oﬀer to the ﬁrst spouse must satisfy w1 >w ∗∗
1 , while the wage oﬀer
to spouse 2 must be less than w∗
2(w1). Now when the second agent does not work, it is
straightforward to compute the ﬁrst agent’s preference parameter value since








10We are restricting the preference parameters to be independent mainly for computational simplicity at
this point, though are intention is to allow some dependence in these parameters in our future research. For
the moment, all assortative mating is captured through dependence in wage oﬀers.
11The noncooperative case is actually nested (in a limiting sense) within the noncooperative case, as ζ → 0.
17and all of the terms on the right hand side of [6] are observable. Thus the likelihood of












where the ﬁrst term in brackets is the absolute value of the Jacobian, which together with
the second term in brackets comprises the density of hours of spouse 1 conditional on the
wage rate w1. The last term is the marginal density of individual 1’s wage, so that the entire
product gives the joint density of hours and the wage of spouse 1.






gives the critical spouse 2 wage oﬀer such that all w2 below this value lead to a corner
solution for individual 2. Conditional on α2 (in addition to w1 and α1), the probability that




Unconditional on α2 (but conditional on w1 and α1) then the probability that individual 2


























The likelihood of a Type III equilibrium, in which spouse 1 does not work and spouse



















The likelihood of a Type IV equilibrium with observed values of h1,h 2,w 1, and w2 is
computed as follows. Deﬁne Ai =( Y + w1T1 + w2T2)/wi,i=1 ,2, and let
τ =
l1l2
















18Then we can write the implied values of the preference parameters as















A1 τ2(1 − T1−h1
A1 )
τ1(1 − T2−h2







Thus, conditional on the wage draws (w1,w 2), the likelihood the hours choices (h1,h 2)i s
p(h1,h 2|w1,w 2)=JNν1(τ +( 1− τ)
l1
A1




After multiplying by the likelihood of the two wage draws, we get the total likelihood of
the Type IV equilibrium draw as
PIV(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2;ν,µ,Σ) = JNν1(τ +( 1− τ)
T1 − h1
A1





4.2 Estimation of the Costly Cooperation Model
The cooperative model is estimated only under the condition that there exist positive co-
ordination costs for the reasons stated above. In terms of determining whether or not a
data observation for a sample household corresponds to a noncooperative or a cooperative
equilibrium, this is relatively straightforward in many cases given our modeling assump-
tions. In the sample utilized in the empirical analysis we have excluded all households in
which neither spouse is employed; there were less than ﬁve households that were excluded
on the basis of this criterion. Thus the relevant parts of the likelihood function pertain to
households in which both spouses work or in which only one works.
We begin by considering the case in which spouse 1 works and spouse 2 does not,
which was referred to as a Type II case above. In this situation we observe w1 and h1 as
well as Y. From the theoretical analysis presented in the previous section, we know that
in this case the household equilibrium must be of the noncooperative type. Thus, the
likelihood contribution for this case shares much with PII above, except that the likelihood
of noncooperation must be explicitly included. Now the likelihood of noncooperation is
given by
Q(ξ∗(Γ);ζ),
where the “essential” elements of Γ include (w1 w2 α1 α2); we will omit the elements Y and
T1 and T2 which are assumed to be observable for all sample members. As before, the data




















In contrast to the expression for PII, it is necessary to integrate over the unobserved wage
w2 even after conditioning on a value of α2, since the critical value ξ∗ required to compute
the probability of noncooperation depends on both of these state variables in addition to
w1 and α1.
The likelihood contribution for the case in which individual 2 works and individual 1



















Lastly we consider the likelihood contribution of households for whom both spouses
work. In this situation the equilibrium can be either noncooperative or (costly) cooperative.
Our strategy will be to compute P(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2,h 1 > 0,h 2 > 0,N)a n dP(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2,h 1 >
0,h 2 > 0,C), and then to compute the marginal likelihood contribution by summing over
the behavioral modes, or
P(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2,h 1 > 0,h 2 > 0) = P(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2,h 1 > 0,h 2 > 0,N)
+P(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2,h 1 > 0,h 2 > 0,C).
The computation of the term P(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2,h 1 > 0,h 2 > 0,N) is the most straight-
forward. Given that all of the dependent variables h1,h 2,w 1,w 2 are observed, under non-
cooperation the calculation of the likelihood of the event is identical to what appears in
PIV(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2;ν,µ,Σ), up to multiplication by the likelihood that the outcome is non-
cooperative. Given the observed w1 and w2 and the implied values of α1(w1,w 2,h 1,h 2)a n d
α2(w1,w 2,h 1,h 2), we know the critical value ξ∗(w1,w 2,α 1,α 2), so that the probability of
noncooperation is simply Q(ξ∗(w1,w 2,α 1,α 2);ζ). Thus we have
P(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2,h 1 > 0,h 2 > 0,N)=PIV(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2;ν,µ,Σ)
×Q(ξ∗(w1,w 2,α 1(w1,w 2,h 1,h 2),α 2(w1,w 2,h 1,h 2));ζ)( 7 )
Calculation of the joint likelihood of h1 and h2 under cooperation is a bit more involved,
simply because the likelihood of any given pair of (h1,h 2), given (w1,w 2), depends on the
cost of cooperation, ξ.Th e r e i s a 1 − 1 mapping between (h1,h 2)a n d( α1,α 2)i nt h ec o -
operative equilibrium conditional on Z and ξ, where Z ≡ (w1,w 2,Y). Let us denote this
dependence by (αC
1 (ξ,h1,h 2,Z),α C
2 (ξ,h1,h 2,Z)). We can compute the value of the non-
cooperative equilibrium for each individual, V N
i (αC
1 (ξ,h1,h 2,Z),α C
2 (ξ,h1,h 2,Z),Z)g i v e n
20h1,h 2, and Z for any given value of ξ, i =1 ,2.12 Then deﬁne ξC as that value of ξ such
that
ξ>ξ C ⇔ ˆ S(ξ;·,α C
1 (ξ,h1,h 2,Z),αC
2 (ξ,h1,h 2,Z),Z) > 0.
Due to the discontintuity in the labor supply functions at all points at which behavior
switches between cooperation and noncooperation, it is not the case that ξ∗ is the same
as ξC. Under our distributional assumptions regarding the preference parameters, we can
relatively easily write down the joint density for hours given wages and cooperation, where
cooperation is assured by considering only values ξ>ξ C. This joint conditional density of
hours, at a given level of ξ>ξ C,i sg i v e nb y

























Now we can complete the construction of the term P(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2,h 1 > 0,h 2 > 0,C). It is
given by  1
ξC
m(h1,h 2|w1,w 2,ξ,ξ>ξC)fW1,W2(w1,w 2;µ,Σ)dQ(ξ;ζ). (8)
The sum of [7] and [8] yields RIV(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2;ν,µ,Σ,ζ), and completes the speciﬁcation
of the likelihood function associated with the model of costly cooperation.
The computation of the log likelihood associated with this model is signiﬁcantly more
involved and (computer) time intensive than the one associated with the noncooperative
equilibrium model. The most intensive calculation is that of P(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2,h 1 > 0,h 2 >
0,C), since we must compute the functions αC
i (ξ,h1,h 2,Z),i=1 ,2, and the Jacobian JC
at a number of values of ξ in the interval (ξC,1). To speed up computation, we evaluate the







ˆ P(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2,h 1 > 0,h 2 > 0,C)=m(h1,h 2|w1,w 2,ξ(ξC),ξ>ξC)fW1,W2(w1,w 2;µ,Σ) ˜ Q(ξC;ζ).
The log likelihood is maximized using ˆ P(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2,h 1 > 0,h 2 > 0,C)i np l a c eo f
P(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2,h 1 > 0,h 2 > 0,C) when forming RIV(h1,h 2,w 1,w 2;ν,µ,Σ,ζ). All other
components of the log likelihood function are as before.
12The value of the noncooperative equilibrium is not itself a function of ξ, which is only paid given
coooperation, but the inferred values of the preference parameters given Z for a particular hours choice
(h1,h 2) depend on ξ given behavior is cooperative. This explains the presence of the term ξ in V
N.
214.3 Relationship between the Two Econometric Speciﬁcations
While the concept of a coordination cost is arguably somewhat vague, framing the choice be-
tween cooperation and noncooperation in this manner has distinct econometric advantages.
As we remarked earlier, such a setup avoids problems of nonuniqueness of the noncoopera-
tive equilibrium associated with nonconvexities introduced into the model when allowing for
the presence of ﬁxed costs of work or minimum hours constraints. In additional advantage
is that the noncooperative model is a special case of the cooperative-choice model. This is
obvious through the following formal result.
Proposition 8 ln LN(ν,µ,Σ) = limζ→0 LC(ν,µ,Σ,ζ) for all (νµΣ).
No formal proof is required. For any values of α, w, and Y, there exists a critical tax
rate ξ∗ ∈ (0,1). Since the probability of noncooperation is given by Q(ξ∗;ζ) and we have
lim
ζ→0
Q(x;ζ) = 1 for all x ∈ (0,1),
then the probability of cooperation is equal to zero for all values of the state variables
(w,h,Y ) and parameters (ν,µ,Σ) so that the cooperative log likelihood is identical to the
noncooperative one term by term.
The above result suggests that we must be on guard for problem which can occur in
the process of model estimation. If the noncooperative model ﬁts the data more adequately
than the costly cooperative model, the likelihood function associated with the later model
is monotone in the parameter ζ. This will result in increasingly values of ˆ ζ during the
iterative process and may cause instability of the optimization algorithm.
5T h e D a t a
The empirical analysis utilizes data from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income
and Wealth (SHIW 1998). The survey is conducted every two years, and gathers information
on the incomes and wealth of family members, labor market hours and earning information,
and sociodemographic characteristics of the households (e.g., age of all of the members of
the family, schooling attainment). For purposes of our analysis we have selected a sample
of households comprised of a married couple with or without children. The husbands are
between 25 and 50 years of age (inclusive), while the wives are between 25 and 45 years
of age. We have also excluded a few extremely high wage, hours, and nonlabor income
observations from our sample. These last restrictions only resulted in the exclusion of
approximately 20 households and left us with a sample size of 1575.
Means and standard deviations of the variables of interest are presented in Table 2.
The ﬁrst column contains information for the entire sample. In this table, all monetary
amounts are expressed in thousands of 1998 lire (ITL). The weekly nonlabor income of
sample households is only about 6100 ITL, but this ﬁgure is a bit misleading given that less
than 15 percent of sample households report any nonlabor income. Of those that do, the
mean weekly amount is 41000 ITL.
The average ages of the spouses diﬀers by about 5 years, which reﬂects the fact that
women tend to marry older men and given our sample selection criterion, which included
22men up to age 50 and women only up to age 45. The schooling distributions for husbands
and wives are similar, though, as is true in the U.S., women tend to have a slightly higher
level of attainment than their husbands. The variable “Mid-level School” is coded one when
the individual has attained any type of high school certiﬁcate, while “High-level School”
assumes the value one when the individual has a laurea (college) degree or other type of post-
high school qualiﬁcation. University completion ﬁgures are very low in Italy, particularly
in comparison with the U.S., and this is one reason that the higher education curriculum
has recently been reformed to allow for three year, in addition to the standard ﬁve year,
degree program. We see that only 11 percent of husbands and wives have completed a ﬁve
year university program.
In column 2 we present descriptive statistics for the subsample of households in which
the husband works and the wife does not. Husbands in these households work about 40
hours per week, though there is a nontrivial standard deviation. We note that spouses in
these households tend to have the lowest schooling attainment levels exhibited by any of
the three subsamples.
Column 3 contains the statistics for the small subsample of households in which only the
wife works. The wife’s average hours of work are relatively low in this case. The average
wage of women in these households is less than the average wage of men in households
in which only they work. Women in these households tend to have the highest level of
educational attainment among the three groups, though there husband’s tend to be well-
educated as well. Since the men are generally of pre-retirement age, perhaps their being
not employed in the reference month is a temporary phenomenon (not considered in our
competitive markets model).
The last column contains the means and standard deviations for the households in
which both spouses work. This is a smaller group than the households in which only the
husband works, which distinguishes the modern day Italian labor market from the U.S.
and Northern European ones. The means and standard deviations of hours worked for the
husbands and wives are similar to what was observed for the households in which only one
worked. Average nonlabor income is greater in these households, but is still at insigniﬁcant
levels for the majority of households in this group. These households have much higher
levels of educational attainment than do households in which only the husband works.
5.1 Estimates of the Noncooperative Model
Computation of the maximum likelihood estimates for the noncooperative model takes less
than one second of CPU time. Unfortunately, the current implementation of the costly
cooperative equilibrium estimator consumes many orders of magnitude more time. As
a result, in this version of the paper we estimate the model speciﬁcations only on 400
observations, which are a randomly selected subsample from the larger sample. Since we
are only attempting to estimate a small number of parameters, there is no reason to believe
that the estimates on the subsample will diﬀer in any major way from what we will obtain
when we use the entire sample.
Table 3 contains estimates of two speciﬁcations of the noncooperative equilibrium model.
As noted previously, under our speciﬁcation of the noncooperative model each household
has a positive probability of being in any one of the three regimes observed in the data (i.e.,
23{h1 > 0,h 2 =0 },{h1 =0 ,h 2 > 0},{h1 > 0,h 2 > 0}).
The ﬁrst column contains the most basic speciﬁcation. In this case, we assume that
all households draw wage pairs from the same lognormal distribution, and that the Cobb-
Douglas parameters α1 and α2 are independently distributed, each according to a power
distribution with parameter νi. The parameters β0,i are the population means of the logs of
the wages of spouse i. We see that there is a slight (but statistically signiﬁcant) diﬀerence in
these parameters, with the husband having the advantage. The estimates of the covariance
matrix of the log wage draws show that the variance of the wives’ draws are signiﬁcantly
larger than the husbands’. This is commonly found when one side has many more censored
observations than the other. There is a high degree of positive association in the wage draws
of the spouses, with the estimate of ρ being 0.470. The last two parameters estimated are
those that describe the preference parameter distribution. Since husbands and wives have
similar population wage oﬀer distributions, and since wives work much less than their
husbands, it is not surprising that the wives’ average valuation of leisure is estimated to be
much greater than their husbands’. The average for the husbands is 0.454, while for wives
it is 0.540.
In the second speciﬁcation we condition the expected value of the log of the wage oﬀer
on schooling attainment of the relevant spouse. The parameters β1,i are associated with a
medium schooling level dummy and β2,i with a high schooling level dummy. The estimates
of the β1,i and β2,i are as expected, with there being a particularly large payoﬀ to having
completed university education (which is a relatively rare event in the sample). After condi-
tioning on schooling attainment, the variances of the log wage draws decrease, as expected.
Moreover, the correlation between the log wage draws is greatly reduced after conditioning
on the schooling levels of the two spouses, though it is still statistically signiﬁcant. The
estimates of the preference distribution parameters are unchanged, reﬂecting the near or-
thogonality of the estimators for preferences and the choice set in this speciﬁcation of the
model.
We also estimated a speciﬁcation, the results from which are not reported, in which we
allowed the distributions of the preference parameters to depend on the total number of
children in the family and the number of children less than seven years of age. Though our
theoretical model makes no provision for household production or investment in children,
we reasoned that such activities may appear as a high valuation for leisure, particularly
among mothers. Thus in that speciﬁcation we deﬁned
νi =e x p ( γi,0 + γi,1kle6 + γi,2nkids),i =1 ,2,
where kle6 is the number of children 6 years of age or less in the household and nkids is
the total number of children of the parents. Neither γi,1 nor γi,2 were signiﬁcant for either
parent. While it may well be the case that household production and child investment are
important phenomena to consider when estimating household labor supply, this method of
introducing family composition variables does not satisfactorily capture the role they play
in household decision-making.
5.2 Estimates of the Costly Cooperation Model
Table 4 contains estimates of the two speciﬁcations of the costly cooperation model. The
parameters estimated are the same as in Table 3 with the exception of ζ, which indexes the
24distribution of tax rates. Column 1 contains estimates from the speciﬁcation that doesn’t in-
clude schooling covariates. In comparison with estimates of the noncooperative equilibrium
model, there are small but noticeable changes in the estimated wage oﬀer distributions. The
estimates of the means of the distributions are lower when cooperation is allowed, though
not by large amounts. In terms of second moment properties of the wage oﬀer distributions,
the estimated variance (marginal) in the oﬀers to husbands is greater under costly coopera-
tion, but the variance in the wife’s oﬀer distribution is less. The estimated correlation in the
oﬀers is much greater under costly cooperation than under the noncooperative equilibrium
assumption.
The biggest diﬀerences in the estimates obtained under the two models are in the pa-
rameters characterizing the preference distributions. The “costly cooperation” estimates
indicate a much larger weight attached to leisure, on average, by both spouses. This result
makes intuitive sense. When both spouses work, the only case in which the household can
be cooperative, hours and wages of both are observed. Conditional on wage rates, a ﬁxed
level of hours implies a higher weight attached to leisure on the part of both spouses than
is the case if the spouses are not cooperating. We see that the magnitude of this impact is
large. The average weight attached to leisure by wives in the noncooperative equilibrium
is about 0.540, while in the costly cooperative equilibrium it is 0.676. The increase is also
substantial for the husband’s average welfare weight, which increases from 0.454 to 0.523.
The second column of Table 4 contains the estimates of the speciﬁcation that includes
schooling attainment. As was true in the noncooperative equilibrium case, this speciﬁcation
ﬁts the data much better than the one in which wage draws are i.i.d. Unlike the noncoop-
erative equilibrium case, explicitly conditioning on schooling does not reduce the level of
correlation in wage draws.
The estimate of the parameter indexing the cooperation tax distribution is about 42
under both speciﬁcations of the model. Since this tax rate is assumed to follow a power
distribution, the mean amount of the tax on consumption under cooperation is about 2.3
percent, with the median tax rate being 1.2 percent. Since a substantial proportion of the
sample is in the noncooperative regime, this indicates that typical gains from cooperation
are not exceedingly large.
The likelihood values associated with the various speciﬁcations lead us to conclude that
the cooperative model is a much better description of the household equilibrium than the
strictly noncooperative model. It is not possible to carry out a standard likelihood ratio
test since the null is associated with a value of ζ on the boundary of the parameter space.
6 The Impact of Changes in Parameters on Household Labor
Supply and Welfare
This section presents some illustrative calculations of the impacts of changes in the labor
market and household environment on labor supply outcomes and the distribution of welfare
within households. We present a few calculations to illustrate our areas of interest. In per-
forming the simulations, we only use point estimates from the “homogeneous” speciﬁcation
of the costly cooperative model, which appear in the ﬁrst column of Table 4.
In performing the simulations we utilized the following technique. In terms of the
25homogeneous speciﬁcation, all individuals are ex ante homogeneous except with respect to
nonlabor income Y. To replicate the properties of the sample, under the model, we have
generated 2500 simulation draws for each sample member (i.e., Yi). The same “raw” sample
draws were used in generating the baseline simulation and the experiments. Since we have
400 sample members, we have one million draws in total.
The two experiments we report on involve changing the preference distribution param-
eter of wives to match those of husbands (admittedly not an option directly available to a
policy maker) and then changing the wage oﬀer distribution of wives to match those of their
husbands (more in the policy realm). We report average values of the mean labor supply
and welfare levels of the spouses, the proportion of households cooperating, and the mean
absolute diﬀerence in the welfare levels of the spouses.
With respect to the baseline, shifting the preference parameter distribution to match
those of their husbands (though keeping the draws independent) results in the largest change
i nt h eo u t c o m e sw em e a s u r e . 13 While the average labor supply of husbands decreases by a
small amount, the labor supply of wives almost doubles. We cannot legitimately compare
the payoﬀs of the wives before and after the change since we have changed their valuation
function. However, the welfare of husbands has signiﬁcantly improved by being married to
someone with a higher valuation of the public good and who therefore supplies no less time
to the market in any state of the world. We see a very large change in the proportion of
cooperative outcomes, from 59 percent to 84 percent.
Partially because the mean diﬀerences in wage oﬀers between spouses were not estimated
to be very large, the impact of increasing the mean log wage oﬀer of wives to their husband’s
level has a very small eﬀect on household outcomes. The increase in the mean log wage oﬀer
to wives is about 8 percent. The changes in all of the outcome measures are substantially
less than this in percentage terms.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have developed a model of “eﬃcient” noncooperation, in which spouses
choose their labor supplies and the mode in which they interact. By introducing a cost to
cooperation, some households in which monitoring or communication costs are large will
rationally decide to behave in a noncooperative manner, which we presume to require no
monitoring (since it is a unique Nash equilibrium) and less communication. Under our
speciﬁcation of preferences and household technology, all households in which one spouse
works must be in the noncooperative mode, while households in which both spouses work
may be behaving cooperatively or noncoooperatively. These theoretical results inform the
construction of the costly cooperative equilibrium likelihood function.
A sample of households from a nationally representative Italian data set is used to
estimate the model. We ﬁrst estimate an equilibrium model in which households behave
noncooperatively, and then add the possibility of cooperation. Indications from the log
likelihood value suggest that the costly cooperative model is a much better description of
the data.
13To what extent this is true even in the noncooperative equilibrium we cannot say since we have not as
yet performed the simulation exercises using that model.
26The most intriguing aspect of the model from the policy point of view is the possibility
that small changes in parameters that may be inﬂuenced by policy actions, such as those
generating wage oﬀer distributions, may lead to small welfare impacts on households but
large changes in labor supply. This can occur due to the fact that household welfare is
continuous in all of the relevant state variables, such as nonlabor income and wage oﬀers, but
labor supply is not. When households switch from a noncooperative to a cooperative mode
of behavior, labor supplies of both spouses increase by a discrete amount. Thus policies




Means and (Standard Deviations)
Variable All h1 > 0,h 2 =0 h1 =0 ,h 2 > 0 h1 > 0,h 2 > 0
Husband’s Hours of Work 40.739 40.255
(8.080) (7.800)
Wife’s Hours of Work 34.707 33.235
(9.106) (9.013)
Husband’s Hourly Wage 14.234 14.866
(5.522) (5.427)
Wife’s Hourly Wage 13.669 13.560
(5.756) (5.766)
Household Nonlabor Income 6.105 4.712 4.153 8.218
(20.911) (19.068) (19.465) (23.027)
Husband’s Age 40.080 40.239 40.087 39.900
(5.857) (6.0510 (5.538) (5.801)
Wife’s Age 36.607 36.382 37.185 36.703
(5.372) (5.459) (4.993) (5.367)
Mid-level School (H) 0.439 0.393 0.451 0.487
Mid-level School (W) 0.462 0.361 0.570 0.546
High-level School (H) 0.105 0.040 0.169 0.148
Wife High-level School (W) 0.112 0.040 0.202 0.169
N 1575 735 183 657
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Descriptive Statistics
Means and (Standard Deviations)
Variable All h1 > 0,h 2 =0 h1 =0 ,h 2 > 0 h1 > 0,h 2 > 0
Husband’s Hours of Work 40.739 40.255
(8.080) (7.800)
Wife’s Hours of Work 34.707 33.235
(9.106) (9.013)
Husband’s Hourly Wage 14.234 14.866
(5.522) (5.427)
Wife’s Hourly Wage 13.669 13.560
(5.756) (5.766)
Household Nonlabor Income 6.105 4.712 4.153 8.218
(20.911) (19.068) (19.465) (23.027)
Husband’s Age 40.080 40.239 40.087 39.900
(5.857) (6.0510 (5.538) (5.801)
Wife’s Age 36.607 36.382 37.185 36.703
(5.372) (5.459) (4.993) (5.367)
Mid-level School (H) 0.439 0.393 0.451 0.487
Mid-level School (W) 0.462 0.361 0.570 0.546
High-level School (H) 0.105 0.040 0.169 0.148
Wife High-level School (W) 0.112 0.040 0.202 0.169
N 1575 735 183 657
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Characteristic Baseline ν1 = ν2 =1 .098 β0,1 = β0,2 =2 .099
h1 0.468 0.443 0.470
h2 0.238 0.420 0.257
V1 0.638 0.735 0.665
V2 0.438 0.737 0.455
C = 1 0.589 0.838 0.607
|V1 − V2| 0.375 0.417 0.383
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